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The purpose of this paper is to elucidate whether the supply side played a crucial role in 
causing credit crunch in 1990s. To this end, we estimated the supply and demand 
functions using prefectural panel data from 1990 to 2001, and calculate the shift of 
those functions. The results reveal that until 1996, the supply function largely shifted 
toward right, indicating that the supply side was not the main cause. However, after 
1996 the loan supply shifted leftwards as much as the loan demand, implying that the 
contraction of supply contributed to the decrease in the loans.   
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1. Introduction 
Japanese loan market has been in severe slump since 1990, which is really a historical 
event. Figure 1 shows the amount of loans advanced by domestically licensed banks 
since 1944. It is apparent that 1990s is the first time in the post war Japan that the 
amount of loan stopped increasing and then decreased significantly. Closer inspection 
reveals that the loan became stagnant around 1993, but it still increased until around 
1998, then it began decreasing.   
In Figure 2, we present the bank credit of commercial banks in U.S. since 1973, 
which shows a monotonic upwards trend. Thus, we may say that the turn of the trend in 
1990s of the outstanding loans in Japan is a global big event. 
Facing this remarkable stagnant amount of loans, they say that firms, especially 
small and medium sized firms, are in trouble in their business because their applications 
for loans are refused by banks. Opinion, including that of the Diet, the government, and 
the media, blamed banks arguing that the problem originates from bank’s reluctance to 
advance loans.   
Many economists argue that a fall in stock prices decreased banks’ asset, which, in 
turn, decreased their capital and therefore their own capital ratio, so that they are 
compelled to compress loans in order to clear the BIS regulation. According to their  2
view, fall in the land price may be another cause because it decreased the value of 
collateral, so that banks suffered losses from bankruptcy of their borrowed firms. Thus, 
Japan fell into a vicious circle where the depression of the Japanese economy. In other 
words, an increase in the bankruptcy of firms, together with a fall of the land price, 
increased non-performing loans, which in turn caused the banks to reduce their loans to 
firms, i.e. credit crunch. In reverse, the credit crunch increased the bankruptcy of 
borrowed firms and worsened the Japanese economy. In order to solve this vicious 
circle, the government injected a huge public fund into banks in 1998 and 1999. 
However, the problem is not so simple. The decrease in and/or stagnation of the 
amount of loans may be due to a decrease in the demand of loans, not due to a decrease 
in the supply of loans. Because Japanese economy has been in serious slump and the 
loan interest rate has been falling throughout 1990s, this view is very convincing.
1  I f  
so, what is necessary to recover from the slump of Japanese economy is to increase the 
demand for loans by raising firms’ effective demand, and the injection of public fund 
into banks is not an effective measure to raise the loans.
2       
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate which side, supply (bank) side or demand 
(firm and household) side caused a decrease in and/or stagnation of loans. As will be 
                                                  
1 Declining loan interest rate is only derived by the left shift of the demand function or right 
shift of the supply function, both of which contradict to credit crunch. 
2  Still it helps banks to amortize their bad loans and escape from their failure.  3
shown in the next section, almost of all the previous studies on the credit crunch have 
focused on the effect of own capital ratio and non-performing loans on the amount of 
loans, and disregard the demand side for loans. It should be noted that the effect of these 
variables is only a necessary condition for the credit crunch; it does not constitute a 
direct evidence for the credit crunch. On the contrary, the present paper is unique to take 
a different method: it estimates the magnitude of shifts of the supply and demand 
functions. A comparison of the magnitude of shifts of the supply and demand functions 
constitutes a direct evidence for the existence of the credit crunch. 
This analysis has an important implication for the economic policy to banks. 
Policies which support banks, e.g. injection of public fund, will decrease their 
importance because they do not substantially increase the amount of loans. This paper 
also aims to investigate how the situation of bank loan market differs among prefectures 
by analyzing panel data for prefectures. 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we survey the 
literature. In section 3, we explain the analytical framework, including specification of 
our model, estimation method, and data. In section 4, we present the results and discuss 
them. In section 5, we conduct an analysis to see the differences among prefectures. 
Section 6 concludes.  4
2.    An overview of the literature 
  There have been many studies on the credit crunch in Japan. Most of them focus on the 
banks, i.e. supply side of loans. They try to explain the stagnant loans in 1990s by a fall 
of land prices, an increase in bad loans, regulation on own capital ratio, and so on. 
Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000) found that non-performing loans and own capital 
ratio had negative and positive effect on loan supply in 1990s, respectively. Namely, 
their study supports the existence of credit crunch. Meanwhile, Yoshikawa et al. (1994) 
found that there was no significant negative correlation between non-performing loan 
ratio and loan supply. In sum, they are negative to the occurrence of the credit crunch in 
early 1990s. 
In many other studies, the results are mixed. For example, Woo (1999), using 
bank’s financial data from 1991 to 1997, made a cross-section analysis of the effect of 
banks’ own capital ratio on loans, and reported that it had significant effect in 1997, but 
not in the other periods. Horie (2001) and Ishikawa (2005) got the similar results. These 
studies may suggest that the credit crunch was severe in the late of 1990s, but not in the 
early 1990s. Ito and Sasaki (2002) tested whether banks’ augmented capitals, which 
were financed by subordinate bonds, affected the loan supply. They found that own 
capital ratio had positive effects on loan supply for large banks, but not for smaller  5
banks. Honda et al. (1995) obtained the similar results. These studies may suggest that 
the credit crunch was severer for larger banks than smaller banks. 
Surprisingly, some studies reported that non-performing loans and own capital 
ratio exerted positive and negative effect respectively on loan supply for specific sectors, 
such as construction and real estate industry. They interpreted this result that banks may 
have advanced additional loans  to the industries which accumulated huge 
non-performing loans. Sasaki (1998) and Tsuru (2001) are in line of this study. 
           
3. Analytical Framework   
3.1 Basic idea of the analysis 
As we have seen in section 2, most of the previous studies focus on the effect of BIS 
regulation and nonperforming loans on the supply of loans paying no attention to the 
demand side. However, credit crunch may become severe when negative loan supply 
shift outweighs negative demand shift. Thus, even if they found a restricting effect of 
BIS regulation, they, at best, confirm the necessary condition for the credit crunch. To 
clarify whether the credit crunch prevails, it is necessary to investigate whether the 
effect of supply side reduction dominates the demand side. Thus, an analysis of the 
demand function is necessary as well as the supply function, which is done in this paper.      6
Then, how to define the credit crunch is still a problem, which has been seldom 
asked in previous studies. Different interpretations are possible. The first interpretation 
is that credit crunch is a phenomenon that banks refuse the application of loans by firms. 
This is the credit rationing, of which there have been large literatures in the banking 
theory. The disequilibrium econometrics is a statistical tool to examine disequilibrium 
credit rationing (Fair and Jaffee, 1972).   
The second interpretation is that the credit crunch is a phenomenon that the loan 
supply function shifts to the left more than the loan demand function. In this case, 
borrowers face strict attitude of banks for advancing loans, leading to a reduction of the 
amount of loans. Borrowers feel that banks are reluctant to advance loans, i.e. the credit 
crunch. 
In this paper we estimate the supply and demand functions for loans, and evaluate 
their magnitude of shifts, and elucidate whether the credit crunch occurred or not in the 
Japanese loan market. We will not apply the disequilibrium econometrics in this paper 
because it may suffer a problem of non-stationarity   
 
3.2    Hypothesis of segmented loan markets by prefecture   
In this paper we utilize panel data of prefectures from 1990 to 2001. We use prefectural  7
data because we suppose that the loan markets in Japan are segmented into each 
prefecture, so that the amount of loans and the loan interest rates are determined based 
on prefectural loan demand and supply.
3                     
This assumption may be supported because regional banks, shinkin banks, and 
credit cooperatives operate in restricted areas. Of course, the segmentation is not perfect, 
if it exists. First, city banks have nationwide branch networks, so that they arbitrage the 
segmented market. Regional banks have 19% of their branches outside the home 
prefecture, so that ‘prefectural loan markets’ actually overlapped. Kano and Tsutsui 
(2003) concluded that loan markets of shinkin banks were segmented for each 
prefecture, but those of regional banks were not, using data in 1996. However, as we 
analyze the period of 1990-2001, we may obtain different results. In this paper, we 
estimate the loan supply and demand functions, assuming that the markets are 
segmented for each prefecture, and if this assumption fails, the estimates of these 
functions will be unreasonable. In contrast, if interest rate and scale variables 
aggregated for each prefecture will show the expected signs, the assumption of 
segmented markets is supported. 
                                                  
3 As explained below, we aggregate bank data to construct data of supply side for each 
prefecture. Alternatively, we can estimate using the data of each bank. However, in this case, 
how to construct demand variables (especially scale variables) for each bank will be a problem. 
Assuming an isolated bank who acts as if a monopoly in its operation area is harder to accept 
than the assumption of prefectural loan markets of this paper.  8
 
3.3 Specification of the loan supply function 
We derive the loan supply function from an inter-temporal profit maximization problem 
of a bank (see Ishikawa, 2005, Ogawa and Kitasaka, 2000, Elyasiani et al., 1995). First 
we define the profit 
k
t π of  k -th bank operating in prefecture i, in  t-th year as 
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prefecture, we assume imperfect loan markets, so that the loan interest rate,  ) ( it it L r , 
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loan and deposit interest rates are identical for banks in the same prefecture. Call rate is 




t fl l C  represents the operational cost function of the bank. 
We assume  0 > l C , 0 ≥ ll C ,  0 > fl C ,  0 , ≥ fl fl C . The reason for  0 > fl C  is the search 
cost for new customers and monitoring cost to mitigate the asymmetric information 
between new customers and a bank. 
k -th bank is assumed to maximize their firm value 
k
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To simplify the model, we assume that 
k
t d  and 
k
t cap  are exogenous variables.
4 
Et is an operator of conditional expectation,  γ(0<γ<1) is the time discount rate. Euler 
equation of (1) becomes 





















































− ≡ η   is the supply elasticity of the total amount of loans in prefecture 






S ≡  is  the  bank k’s market share in prefecture i.  
Taking the linear approximation of the cost function and solving this for 
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where we added the land price,  it LP , non-performing loans, 
k
t bad , own capital, 
k
t cap , and the stock market price index,  t SP , to the explanatory variables, and 
0 / ) ( , , 1 > + ≡ δ γ α l fl fl fl C C , 0 / ) ( , , 2 > + ≡ δ α l fl fl fl C C , 0 / 1 3 > ≡ δ α ,α4>0,  α5<0,  α
6>0,  0 2 ) 1 ( , , > + + + ≡ ll l fl fl fl C C C γ δ
5. 
                                                  
4 Deposit interest rate was deregulated in 1993, so that deposit may be treated as a decision 
variable. Even in this case, the following analysis applies as the Euler equation with respect to 
loan. 
5 If  l fl C ,  was large negative value, δ  becomes negative, so that α3 is negative. However, 
negative sign on α3 is embarrassing because it implies that a bank will increase its lending as the 
loan interest rate rises. Therefore, we postulate  l fl C ,   does not take a large negative value.  10
  α1>0 means a smoothing effect that when the amount of loan in the next period is 
expected to increase, a bank will increase the loan in the current period to restrain an 
increase in new lending costs.  α2>0 means inertia effect that an increase in the loan in 
the former period decreases new lending costs of the current period, so that a bank 
increases the loan in the current period. We expect α4>0 because a decrease in land 
prices lowers the value of the land held by the banks, leading to a decrease in capital 
and therefore in loan supply. A decrease in land prices also lowers the collateral value of 
the land which may increase the screening costs of loan provisions, leading to an 
decrease in loans. We expect α5<0,  α6>0 because an increase in non-performing 
loans and a decrease in own capital result in a rise in probability of bank default, leading 
to reduction of the risky loans.
6  The sign of  α7 is not known a priori because a bank, 
faced with a blip of the stock market price index, increases investment in stocks, leading 
to reduction of the loans, while a rise in the index makes the value of owned stocks 
higher, leading to an increase in capital, so that an increase in loans. 
  Loan supply function for prefecture i  in  t -th year is derived by an 
aggregation of (4). If the number of banks in prefecture  i is I , we obtain 
                                                  
6 Some may  argue  α7>0, because bank will advance more loans to the firms whose borrowings 
becomes non-performing to prevent direct depreciation of the loan (Berglof and Roland, 1995, 
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market structure-performance hypothesis is valid, α8<0. 
 
3.4 Specification of the loan demand function 
We assume that the loan demand increases, as loan interest rates decline, sales increase, 
retained earnings decrease, and the cost of alternative funds, e.g. bonds and equities, 
increases (Me’litz and Pardue, 1973, Fase, 1995, Ogawa and Suzuki, 2000). We also 
assume that land prices and stock price market index affect the loan demand. An 
increase of land prices boosts the value of land held, lowers the probability of default,   
and increases the investment, which may augment the loan demand. The effect of stock 
price market index on the loan demand has two ways to look at; a firm, faced with a 
clime of the index, may increase fund raising from issuing stocks, leading to reduction 
of the loans, while a rise in the index reflects better business condition in the future, 
which may increase the loans. In addition, housing starts may be important in Japan  12
considering that many people borrow in their younger period to buy a house and smooth 
the utility from housing. 
  When firms and households borrow from a new bank, additional search cost 
emerges, as is the case of the loan supply. Thus, the loan demand also depends on the 
past demand and the future expected demand. Since the data of retained earnings per 
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where  it SALE   is shipment of products,  it HOUSE   is housing starts, 
b
t r   is the interest 
rate of the bond, 
D
i ν  is individual effect of prefecture i, and 
D
it ε    represents i.i.d. 
disturbance term with  0 ] [ =
D
it E ε . We expect  β1>0,  β2>0,  β3<0,  β4>0,  β5>0,  β
6>0, and  β8>0 . The sign of  β7 is not known a priori. 
 
3.5 Data 
In this paper we use annual data from 1990 to 2001 for each prefecture. However, only 
data of amount of outstanding loans, shipment of products, and number of housing starts 
are available for each prefecture. Therefore, as for the data of loan interest rates, amount 
of non-performing loans, and the amount of bank capital, we construct the data for each 
prefecture by aggregating corresponding data of individual bank.
 Specifically, denoting  13
financial data of  k -th bank as  kt x , 
1) for regional and second regional banks, which we call group A, we just add up  kt x  
of banks whose head offices locate in prefecture  i. 
2) for city banks, trust banks, and long term credit banks, which we call group B, we 
multiply  k x   with weight to prefecture  i,  kit w , and then, add up the products.
 7 






and group A k group k
kt kit kt it x w x X
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                      (7) 
kit w  is defined as (the number of employees who work at branches of  k -th bank in 
t-th year located in prefecture  i)/(the number of employees who work at branches of 
k -th bank in  t-th year)
8 
Data description is given in Table 1.  What is interesting in this Table is that gap 
between minimum and maximum is quite large except for the loan interest rate. Indeed, 
The ratio of maximum/minimum is 248 for loans, 39 for land price, 126650 for 
non-performing loans, 663 for own capital, 74 for sales, and 39 for construction of 
housing. Thus, the economic variables are largely diversified among the prefectures.   
The precise definition of the data are given in Appendix. 
                                                  
7  We delete Bank of Tokyo because it is substantially specialized in international transactions, 
and Shinsei bank and Aozora bank because of the data restriction. 
8  The data of the number of employees for each prefecture have been described in the financial 
statement reports until 1998. Thereafter, the data of 1998 is replicated.  14
3.6  Estimation  method 
Assuming that the loan markets are in equilibrium, we estimate (5) and (6) 
simultaneously by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Endogenous variables are 
loan interest rate and the amount of outstanding loans. As for the expected value of loan, 
we assume perfect foresight,  1 1] [ + + = it it t L L E .  
We estimate our model by GMM, in which we control fixed effect by subtracting 
individual mean from the equations,
9 as well as by ‘Error-Component 3SLS Model’ 
(hereafter, EC3SLS, see Hsiao, 2003, and Baltagi, 2001).  The distribution of the 
Hausman test of these two estimations, to our knowledge, is not known yet. Thus, we 
adopt the estimation by ‘fixed effect model’ which has the consistency, and present 
results by EC3SLS just for a reference. Instrumental variables are all the variables in (5) 
and (6) except for loan interest rate and the amount of loans which are endogenous 
variables, and density of population. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
                                                  
9 If we employ the fixed effect model to estimate a dynamic equation with panel data, it will 
suffer from endogeniety problem that lags of dependent variable are not orthogonal to error 
terms. In order to cope with this problem, one may difference eqs. (5) and (6), and estimate 
them with instrumental variables chosen to be orthogonal to the error term (Arrelano and Bond, 
1991, Anderson and Hsiao, 1981). However, we give up taking this method because the shifts of 
‘differenced’ demand and supply curve are hard to interpret.  15
4.1 Estimates of the supply and demand functions 
We estimated (5) and (6), using the data of  BAD  and CAP  of the current and former 
periods. Estimation with the data of the current period suffers a problem that  SALE  is 
not significant and J-statistic is significant at the 10% level, which suggests 
misspecification of the model. Banks probably refer to BAD  and  CAP  of the 
previous period because they cannot get their current data by the time they make 
decision on advancing loans. 
The results with the data of BAD  and  CAP  of the previous period are 
presented in the left column of Table 2. The lead and lag of the loan are significantly 
positive in the supply function as expected. Spread between the loan interest rate and 
the call rate (SPR) is significantly positive as expected. Land price is positive but 
insignificant. While own capital is significantly positive as expected, non-performing 
loan is insignificant.
10 The Herfindahl index is insignificant, indicating the market 
structure-performance hypothesis is not valid. The stock market price index is 
significantly negative, implying that banks in the bull equity market may increase 
investment in stocks, while reducing the loans instead. 
Looking at the results of the demand function, the lead and lag of the loan are 
                                                  
10 When we drop own capital,  BAD  becomes negative but remains insignificant at the 10% 
level.  16
significantly positive, loan interest rate significantly negative, sales significantly 
positive, and bond interest rate significantly positive, as are all expected. Land price is 
positive but insignificant. Housing starts is insignificant, suggesting that borrowing by 
households is still a small part of the loan advanced by banks. The stock market price 
index is significantly negative, implying that firms in the soaring equity market may 
increase fund raising in stocks, while reducing the bank borrowings. J-statistic is not 
significant at the10% level, supporting this specification.   
We estimate the functions deleting the number of housing starts and the other 
insignificant variables, such as land price, non-performing loans, and the Herfindahl 
index. The results which are shown in the right column of Table 2 are almost the same 
as those in which that variable is included (the left column). In sum, these results are 
satisfactory, suggesting that the assumption of segmented prefectural markets reflects 
the reality fairly well.   
Two stage least squares (hereafter, 2SLS) is less efficient than GMM, but it may 
be a good method in the sense that estimation of one equation is not disturbed by a 
possible specification error of the other equation because it disregard the correlation 
between error terms of eqs. (5) and (6). Thus, we also estimate them with 2SLS. The 
results which are shown in Table 3 are almost the same as those by GMM, however, the  17
estimated coefficients like SALE become less significant as the econometric theory 
predicts. The exception is that the land price and housing starts in the loan demand 
function turn to be significantly positive. 
The results by EC3SLS are shown in Table 4. Here, the Herfindahl index, SALE, 
and housing starts are insignificant. Loan and bond interest rate in the demand side have 
wrong signs, both of which are significant. Thus, EC3SLS gives less reasonable results 
than fixed effect model. This may imply that error term in the random effect model and 
explanatory variables are not orthogonal, so that EC3SLS loses the consistency. 
 
4.2 Magnitude of the shift of the supply and demand functions 
Based on the estimates shown in the right column of Table 2, we calculate the shift of 
the supply and demand functions for each year from 1991 to 2001. First, we substitute 
the mean of each explanatory variable in 1991 and calculate the fitted value of supply of 
and demand for loans. Then, substituting the mean of loan interest rate in 1991 and the 
mean of the other variables in 1992, we calculate the fitted value in 1992. The 
discrepancy between the fitted values is the magnitude of the shifts from 1991 to 1992. 
11 
                                                  
11  We calculate the ratio of the shift by dividing the magnitude of the shifts by the fitted value. 
The results are almost the same as Figure 3 in which 100 billion yen corresponds 1%.  18
Figure 3, which presents the results of such calculations, reveals two facts. The 
one is that the actual value, the supply function, and the demand function shifted toward 
the right (i.e. an increase) before 1996, while they shifted toward the left (a decrease) 
thereafter. The other is that before 1996 a right (i.e. an increase) shift of the supply 
function always exceeded that of the demand function, while after 1996 both shifts were 
roughly of similar magnitude. 
Let us consider the period prior to 1996. The positive shift of the actual value 
implies that the amount of outstanding loans increased every year. According to the 
result, one may argue that the credit crunch did not exist. However, as we explained in 
Introduction, although the amount of loans continued to increase until 1996, its speed 
slowed down remarkably compared with the speed in 1980s. Thus, it is not convincing 
to argue that the credit crunch did not exist because of positive growth rate of loans. 
Figure 3 indicates, however, the increase in loans in this period was induced by an 
increase in supply rather than an increase in demand. The stagnant loan market was 
caused by the stagnant loan demand. Therefore, we conclude that credit crunch did not 
occur in this period. 
In the period after 1996, the amount of loan decreased and left shifts of the supply 
and demand functions are roughly of the same magnitude. This implies that the decrease  19
in loan depended on both of supply and demand. Comparing with the situation before 
1996, we may say that the credit crunch became more prevalent. 
To quantify how severe the credit crunch was during the periods, we calculate the 
differences between supply and demand shifts (demand shift－supply shift), which we 
adopt as an indicator of the credit crunch. The magnitude of this measure indicates the 
contribution of supply shift relative to demand shift. If this is positive, it means supply 
shift relatively contributes to decrease the loan. Therefore, the difference between 
supply and demand shifts (demand shift－supply shift) may be a good measure for the 
credit crunch.   
Figure 4 which shows the difference reveals two facts. The one is that the degree 
of the credit crunch grows during the period from 1992 to 2000, implying the credit 
crunch became severer in the late 90’s. IOne may alternatively argue that the credit 
crunch was not the case at all before 1996 except for 1994, but it might have been 
thereafter. The other fact is that credit crunch was greatly eased in 1995.   
Let us compare these results with Diffusion Index (D.I.) of lending attitude of 
financial institutions announced by the Bank of Japan. The D.I. is defined as the ratio of 
the firms considering that lending attitude becomes severer – the ratio of the firms 
considering that lending attitude becomes laxer, which is presented in Figure 5 from  20
1990 to 2002. The Figure reveals that the lending attitude became laxer until 1996, and 
turned sharply to ‘severer’ in 1997. The Figure also digs up the fact that the lending 
attitude was the easiest in around 1995. The Figure is generally consistent with our 
conclusion derived from Figure 3 and Figure 4.   
 
4.3 Impact of the public funds injection to bank lending 
In 1998 and 1999, the Japanese government injected public funds into troubled banks, 
aiming to stabilize the flurried financial system and to relax the credit crunch. It is 
worthwhile to evaluate the effects of infusions on the bank lending by a simulation 
method. 
In our simulation, we assume that the total amount of injected money is 
distributed for the prefecture i with the weighting factor of CAPi /ΣCAPi (i.e. the ratio 
of the amount of banks’ capitals in prefecture i to that in whole Japan). Calculateing the 
difference between the loan supply shifts with and without the injection, we evaluate the 
impact of the public funds injection. Consequently, our simulation reveals that the 
differences are 1.35 and 5.88 billion yen in 1999 and 2000 respectively.
12 Compared 
with the actual shifts in 1999 and 2000, which are -142.31 and -173.53 billion yen, the 
                                                  
12 The capital injection affects the loan supply in the next year because we used the 
one-period-lagged capital in estimating the loan supply equation.  21
impacts was rather small. 
 
5. Analysis of the Credit Crunch by Prefecture 
5.1 Magnitude of the shifts for each prefecture 
We substitute the value of the explanatory variables of each prefecture to construct the 
fitted value for each prefecture. Then, we calculate the shifts for the period of 
1991-1996, and divide it by the fitted value to get the rate of the shifts, which is shown 
in Figure 6. 
Looking at the shift of the actual value, it increased over 10% for most of 
prefectures. Those that increased over 20% are (Aomori), (Iwate), Akita, Yamagata, 
Niigata, Nagano, Mie, Okayama, Shimane, Tottori, (Tokushima), Kochi, Fukuoka, 
(Saga), Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Oita, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima, most of which are rural 
prefectures (those increased over 30% are in parentheses). In contrast, those increased 
only less than 10% are (Tokyo), Aichi, Kyoto, (Osaka), Hyogo, Wakayama, and Ehime, 
most of which are urban prefectures (those decreased are in parentheses).       
We present the rate of shift for each prefecture in the period 1996 to 2000 in 
Figure 7. Most of the prefectures decreased their amount of loan in this period. Those 
increased the loans are Aomori, Iwate, Akita, Yamagata, Saitama, Toyama, Gifu,  22
Shizuoka, Tottori, Okayama, Tokushima, Ehime, Kochi, Oita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima, 
and Okinawa, most of which overlap with the prefectures increased over 20% during 
1991 to 1996 (the overlapped prefectures are underlined). On the other hand, those 
decreased over 5% are Hokkaido, Miyagi, Gunma, Tokyo, Niigata, Ishikawa, 
Yamanashi, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Wakayama, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, and Kagawa, 
most of which have large cities like the prefectures whose loans increased less than 10% 
in the former period (the overlapped prefectures are underlined). Indeed, the correlation 
coefficient between the actual shifts in both periods is 0.56, which is significantly 
positive.
13 
Comparing Figure 7 with Figure 6, it is apparent that the mean of actual shift 
became negative in the latter period, and that magnitude of the supply shift is similar to 
that of the demand shift in the latter period.   
 
5.2 Prefectures that have large cities decreased more loans 
In order to confirm the conclusion of the previous subsection, we compare the 
characteristics of those prefectures whose shift was large and small. In Table 5, we split 
the whole prefectures into those 23 prefectures whose rate of shift was over 18% in the 
                                                  
13  In the test of no correlation when the number of samples is 47, no correlation is not rejected 
if the correlation coefficient is under 0.28.  23
former period of 1991 to 1996 and the other 24 prefectures, and present the mean of 
various economic variables such as GDP and price level for each group. In the extreme 
right column in the Table, we show the ratio of the means of the both groups , i.e. (mean 
of high rate shift group)/ (mean of low rate shift group). Looking at the ratio, item that 
the mean is larger for the high group is only area of prefecture. Those items for which 
two groups are roughly the same are per capita GDP, price level, the number of 
branches of regional banks, and the number of branches of all financial intermediaries. 
As for the population and GDP, the mean of high group is a half of low group, for 
population density 1/4, and for the number of branches of city banks less than 10%. As 
for the amount of loans and deposits, high group is far small. 
In Table 6, we present these figures for the period of 1996 to 2000. Here we divide 
the group by the criterion that the loan decreased over or less than 2%. Looking at the 
ratio shown in the extreme right column, the same tendency of the previous period, even 
if not so clear, is recognized in the latter period.   
These results indicate that prefectures whose loans became stagnant are those 
which have large population, population density and many branches of city banks. 
Prefectures whose loans decreased in the latter period have a similar tendency. 
One might question this result because they say that the credit crunch has been  24
severer for medium and small sized firms than for large firms, and large firms are more 
concentrated in large cities. Thus, let us confirm that loans to medium and small sized 
firms decreased more. In Table 7, we show the rate of change in loans to lager firms and 
smaller firms. When we define large firms A as those whose capital is over 1 billion yen, 
the change is 1.19% during 1991-1996 and -16% during 1996-2000, while small firms A 
defined as those whose capital is less than 1 million yen is -29.4% and -62.1%, 
respectively. Thus, casual observation is confirmed. This conclusion remains true for the 
period of 1966-2000 when we define large and small firms B as those whose capital is 
more and less than 100 million yen.       
Thus, one possible interpretation of these contradictory facts is that banks’ attitude 
of advancing loan was different between rural and urban area. If banks, especially large 
banks in large cities, decreased the loans, especially loans to smaller firms radically, our 
results and the conventional observations on loans to different sized firms are 
compatible. We show the rate of change in loans advanced by city banks and regional 
banks at the right column if Table 7, which reveals that the loans of city banks decreased 
more than those of regional banks in both periods.   
 
5.3 The credit crunch was severer in urban prefectures  25
The difference between supply and demand shifts may be a good measure for the credit 
crunch. Thus, we calculate the rate of demand shift – the rate of supply shift for the 
period of 1991-96, which we call DIFF91 (see Figure 8). Prefectures whose DIFF91 is 
less than -15% are Aomori, Iwate, Akita, Yamagata, Fukui, Yamanashi, Tottori, 
Shimane, Tokushima, Kochi, Saga, Oita, and Miyazaki, most of which overlap with 
those increased loans over 20% in the early 1990s (overlapped prefectures are 
underlined). On the other hand, prefectures whose DIFF91 is more than -5% are 
Hokkaido, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Shizuoka, Aichi, Osaka, Hyogo, 
Hiroshima, and Fukuoka, most of which have large cities as the prefectures whose loans 
increased less than 10% (overlapped prefectures are underlined). Indeed, correlation 
coefficient between the actual growth rate of loans and DIFF91 is 0.54, which is highly 
significant. This suggests that the increase in actual loans in the period 1991 to 1996 is 
caused by rightward shift of supply function, implying that the credit crunch did not 
prevail at all. 
Next, we calculate the rate of demand shift – the rate of supply shift in the later 
period, DIFF00. Prefectures whose DIFF00 is less than -1.5% are Iwate, Akita, 
Yamagata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yamanashi, Shiga, Nara, Wakayama, Tottori, 
Shimane, Yamaguchi, Tokushima, Kagawa, Kochi, Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Oita,  26
Miyazaki, Kagoshima, and Okinawa, while those more than -0.5% are Saitama, Chiba, 
Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and Fukuoka (prefectures which overlap with those of 
which loan was over 0% or less than 5%, are underlined, respectively). Thus, 
prefectures with relatively small supply shift are those which have large cities. However, 
the prefectures with relatively large supply shift are somewhat different from those 
whose shift of the actual loans was large. In fact, correlation coefficient between the 
actual growth rate of loans and DIFF00 is -0.19, which does not reject no correlation, 
even if it takes negative sign. In sum, we cannot conclude that the decrease in loan in 
the later period was mainly due to supply side. 
 
7. Conclusions   
In this paper, we analyze whether the supply side played a crucial role in causing 
stagnant and declining outstanding loans in 1990s. In other word, the purpose of this 
paper is to make clear whether the credit crunch really happened in Japanese loan 
market. 
In this paper we calculate the magnitude of the shift of the supply and demand 
functions assuming market equilibrium. If the supply function shifted towards left more 
than the demand function, borrowers would have faced strict attitude of banks, which  27
means existence of credit crunch. Under the assumption that the Japanese loan markets 
are segmented by prefecture, we estimated the supply and demand functions using 
prefectural panel data from 1990 to 2001.   
The estimation results reveal that until 1996 the supply function shifted more 
toward right than the demand function, indicating that the stagnation in the loan markets 
in this period cannot be explained by the supply side. However, after 1996 when the 
amount of loans decreased, the loan supply shifted leftwards as much as the loan 
demand, implying that the contraction of supply contributed partly to the decrease of the 
actual loans. 
Examining the rate of shift of loans by prefecture, amount of loan, as well as 
supply and demand, decreased more in the prefectures which have large cities. The 
credit crunch, if it existed, was severer in urban prefectures than rural prefectures.    28
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Appendix: The precise definitions of the data 
Bank Loans Outstanding: “Deposits, Loans and Discounts Outstanding of Domestically 
Licensed Banks by Prefecture (at the end of the fiscal year)”, Source: Economic 
Statistics by Prefecture, Bank of Japan.   
Land Prices: “Land Price of Residential District (average, unit is 100 yen/m
2)”, Source:   
Land Price Survey by Prefecture, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.   
Call Rates: “Unsecured Overnight Call Rate (monthly average balance)”, Source: 
Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly, Bank of Japan.. 
Shipment of Products: “Statistics by Prefecture, Shipment of Products (employees over 
4 people, all manufacturing industries, calendar year)”, Source: Industrial 
Statistics (Manufacturing Industry), Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry.   
Housing Starts: “The Number of Housing Starts, Classified by Funds and Purposes 
(houses funded by private sector, owned house)”, Source: Statistical Report on 
Execution of Construction Work, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.   
Bond Rates: “Subscriber's Yield of 10-year Government Bond (annual average)”, 
Source: Home Page of Bank of Japan. 
Stock market price index: “Nikkei Average of 225 Selected Issues in the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (at the end of the fiscal year, monthly average), Source: Home Page of 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
Non-performing loans: “Allowances for Loan Losses”, Source: Nikkei Needs Bank 
data
14. 
Own capital: “the sum of capital stock, payment for new shares, capital reserve, earned 
surplus reserve, voluntary reserve, and unappropriated profit”, Source: Nikkei 
Needs Bank data.   
Loan interest rate of prefecture i at t-th year is calculated as “(loan interest revenue of 
prefecture i at t-th year)/ (amount of outstanding loan of prefecture i at the end of 




                                                  
14  There have been three data on non-performing loans other than reserve for default. We adopt 
allowances for loan losses because the other data are available only for limited period, and the 
definition of the data varies over time.  31
 
Table  1.  Descriptive  Statistics 
       






SPR  2.09 0.920 -1.68  3.80 
RL  4.02 1.89 1.65  8.56 
RC  1.93 2.53  2.00×10
-3 8.28 
RB  3.24 1.80 0.972  6.80 






HI  0.405 0.172 0.0747  0.802 
BAD  78.6  3.04×10
















Notes：L is amount of outstanding loans (in billion yen), SPR spread 
between the loan interest rate and the call rate (in percent), RL the loan 
interest rate (in percent), RC the call rate (in percent), RB the bond 
interest rate (subscriber's yield of 10-year government bond, in 
percent), LP the land price (per unit square meter, in ten thousand yen), 
SP the stock market price index (in yen), HI the Herfindahl index, 
BAD amount of non-performing loans (in billion yen), CAP amount of 
own capital (in billion yen), SALE amount of sales (in billion yen), and 
HOUSE the number of housing starts. The sample period is from 1990 
to 2001, and the number of prefecture is 47. The number of 










 Notes：See notes to Table 1 for definition of the variables. The dependent variable is amount of 
outstanding loans. L(+1) and L(-1) denote a one-year lead and lag of amount of outstanding 
loans. BAD(-1) and CAP(-1) denote a one-year lag of amount of non-performing loans and own 
capital. The loan demand and supply equations are estimated simultaneously by the GMM, in 
which we control fixed effect by subtracting individual mean from the equations. Endogenous 
variables are amount of outstanding loans and loan interest rate. Instrumental variables are all 
the variables in the loan demand and supply equations except the endogenous variables, and 
density of population. Number in parentheses ( ) are t-ratios. The superscripts ***,
 **, and * 
mean that the variables are significant at the 1%(***),
 5%(**), and 10%(*) level. J-Statistics 
tests the null hypothesis that over-identified restriction is satisfied in the GMM estimation. 
p-values are shown in brackets [ ]. The sample period is from 1991 to 2000, and the number of 
prefecture is 47. The number of observations is 470. 
Table 2.    Estimation Results of the loan supply and demand function (GMM) 
L(+1) +  0.487
***  (16.1) 0.504
***   (20.7) 
L(-1) +  0.472
***   (13.3) 0.461
***  (17.1) 
SPR  +  3.88×10
2**  (2.28)  4.77×10
2** (2.40) 
LP  +  0.446    (0.583)   
BAD(-1) -  7.87×10
-3 
  (0.344)   
CAP(-1) + 0.0526
**  (2.32) 0.0453
***  (2.67) 
HI  -  5.15×10
2  (1.36)   
SP  ?  -0.0799
***  (-3.45)  -0.0797
***   (-3.21)
     
L(+1) +  0.484
***  (15.6)  0.505
***  (19.9) 
L(-1) +  0.475
***  (13.3)  0.459
***  (16.7) 
RL  -  -1.15×10
2** (-2.53)  -1.28×10
2**  (-2.49)
LP  +  0.448   (0.591)   
SALE  +  4.59×10
-3** (2.36) 3.65×10
-3*  (1.90) 
HOUSE  +  -6.30×10
-3 (-0.547)   
SP  ?  -0.0514
**  (-2.07) -0.0460
*   (-1.67) 
RB  +  49.7
**  (2.33) 49.5
**   (2.10) 
     
J-Statistics   10.7  5.44 
   [0.219]  [0.364]  33
 
 
Notes：The loan demand and supply functions are estimated simultaneously by the two-stage 
least squares, in which we control fixed effect by subtracting individual mean from the 
equations. Endogenous variables are amount of outstanding loans and loan interest rate. 
Instrumental variables are all the variables in the loan demand and supply equations except the 
endogenous variables, and density of population. Also refer to Notes to Table2. 
Table 3. Estimation Results of the loan supply and demand function (2SLS) 
L(+1) +  0.493
***  (13.6) 0.538
***  (13.4) 
L(-1) +  0.482
***   (9.79) 0.445
***  (9.65) 
SPR  +  8.79×10
2**  (2.38)  4.40×10
2  (1.49) 
LP  +  1.50  (1.56)   
BAD(-1) -  -0.0846 
  (-0.776)  
CAP(-1) +  0.346
***  (3.27) 0.398
***  (2.95) 
HI  -  -4.02×10
3  (-1.33)   
SP  ?  -0.113
**  (-2.39)  -0.0881
**  (-1.98) 
      
L(+1) +  0.475
***  (10.4)  0.535
***  (11.0) 
L(-1) +  0.498
***  (9.10)  0.441
***  (8.78) 
RL  -  -2.42×10
2  (-1.61)  -1.88×10
2  (-1.23) 
LP  +  2.84
*  (1.70)   
SALE  + -0.0181    (-0.571) 0.0178  (0.843) 
HOUSE  +  0.188
*  (1.86)   
SP  ? -0.0396  (-1.00)  -0.0467  (-1.12) 
RB  +  1.12×10
2  (0.664)  99.6  (0.546)  34
 
Notes ： The loan demand and supply functions are estimated simultaneously by the 
error-corrected three-stage least squares. Endogenous variables are amount of outstanding loans 
and loan interest rate. Instrumental variables are all the variables in the loan demand and supply 













Table 4.    Estimation Results of the loan supply and demand function (EC3SLS) 
L(+1) +  0.482
***  (79.3) 0.506
***  (68.1) 
L(-1) +  0.521
***   (87.9) 0.498
***   (71.1) 
SPR  +  6.70×10
2***  (9.07)  1.32×10
2  (0.733) 
LP  +  0.198
***  (5.55)   
BAD(-1) -  -0.249
*** 
  (-8.50)   
CAP(-1) +  0.0354
***  (2.98)  2.64×10
-3  (0.150) 
HI  - -91.2
  (-1.07)  
SP  ?  -0.0563
***  (-4.56)  -0.0450  (-1.06) 
      
L(+1) +  0.503
***  (36.3)  0.514
***  (26.4) 
L(-1) +  0.500
***  (37.1)  0.490
*** (25.8) 
RL  -  3.13×10
2*** (2.89)  1.34×10
2  (0.700) 
LP  +  0.226
**  ( 2 . 1 3 )    
SALE  +  -9.02×10
-4 (-1.30) 1.61×10
-3  (1.53) 
HOUSE  +  2.01×10
-5  (1.01×10
-3)   
SP  ?  -0.0717
**  (-2.21)  -0.0519  (-0.936) 
RB  +  -2.55×10
2**  (-2.19) -1.41×10
2  (-0.693)  35
Table 5. Salient features of prefectures having large and small actual shifts of bank loans: 1991-1996 
the rate of actual shift of bank loan (R91)>18  the rate of actual shift of bank loan (R91)<18 
 average 
standard 
deviation minimum maximum average 
standard 
deviation minimum maximum  
ratio 
(high R/low R)
per capita GDP  0.032  0.004  0.027  0.043  0.037  0.008  0.025  0.067    0.874 
GDP  61088  44921  20097  198776  143762  172733  30084  797050    0.425 
price level  90  2  85  93  92  3  87  99    0.978 
population  1830990  1235842  614070  5669137  3451042  3037463  823939  11849000    0.531 
area  10560  16172  2439  83408  5075  2694  1861  13781    2.081 
population density  253  194  68  1011  1024  1477  154  5755    0.248 
loans outstanding  31299  30458  9412  137073  167844  422725  12733  2066388    0.186 
deposits outstanding  41103  28214  14642  129267  141764  272664  19126  1345602    0.290 
# of city bank 
branches 93 
12  31  1  152  137  303  1  1426    0.089 
# of regional bank 
branches 93 
166  76  83  454  163  61  78  321    1.016 
# of branches of all 
banks 93 
1278  609  610  3239  1652  1107  595  5378    0.773 
# of prefectures  23        24           
Notes: The features of prefectures whose actual rate of shifts of bank loans are over and less than 18% are summarized in the left and right columns 
respectively. The rightmost column is the ratio of the average of high rate shift group to that of low rate shift group. # of city bank branches 93, # of 
regional bank branches 93, and # of branches of all banks 93 are the number of those branches at the end of March, 1993. # of branches of all banks 
includes those of post office, and Agricultural and Fisheries Cooperative Association.  36
Table 6. Salient features of prefectures having large and small actual shifts of bank loans: 1996-2000 











per capita GDP  0.0348  0.0051  0.0269  0.0486    0.0383  0.0083  0.0265  0.0718  0.909 
GDP  76128  70264  21310  339290    142637  182943  25385  848849  0.534 
price level  93  2  89  97    95  3  91  101  0.980 
population  2091475  1645344  614766  6974481    3317001  3044843  765866  11829900  0.631 
area  7173  3336  2264  14816    8371  16516  1861  83408  0.857 
population density 369  408  96  1824    953  1522  68  5745  0.387 
loans outstanding 41256  39665  12014  190636    160590  397640  10903  1909677  0.257 
deposits 
outstanding 
56626  52956  17090  245740    141998  254077  17502  1215734  0.399 
# of city bank 
branches 00 
25  67  1  264    120  281  1  1289  0.208 
# of regional bank 
branches 00 
161  50  80  315    174  87  81  464  0.925 
# of branches of 
all banks 00 
1265  547  600  2990    1662  1122  610  5172  0.761 
# of prefectures  24          23          
Notes: The features of prefectures whose actual rate of shifts of bank loans are over and less than -2% are summarized in the left and right 
columns,,respectively. # of city bank branches 00, # of regional bank branches 00, and # of branches of all banks 00 are the number of those branches 
at the end of March, 2000. Also refer to Notes to Table5.  37
 
Table 7. Rate of change in loans 
  large firms A  small firms A Large firms  B  small firms B  city banks  regional banks
1991-1996  1.19  -29.4 6.08 6.04  -0.836 13.2
1996-2000  -16.0  -62.1 -18.53 -30.50  -1.33 0.172
Note: Large firms A are those whose capital is over 1 billion yen, while small firms A are those whose capital is under 1 million yen. 
























































Loans and Discounts (Domestically Licensed Bank)
 
Notes: The data source is the Financial Statistics Annual, the Bank of Japan. The sample period is from 1944 to 2004. 
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Notes: The data source is the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The sample period is from 1973 to 2003. 
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actual shift shift due to supply side shift due to demand side
 
Notes: The actual shift for year y is the difference between the prefectural average of outstanding loans in year y and that in year y-1. The shift due to supply 
and demand side for year y is calculated as follows: first, we substitute the prefectural average of each explanatory variable in year y-1 and calculate the 
fitted value of supply of and demand for loans in year y. Then, substituting the mean of loan interest rate in year y-1 and the mean of the other variables in 
year y, we calculate the fitted value in year y. The discrepancy between the fitted values is the magnitude of the shifts from year y-1 to y. 
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the degree of credit crunch
 
Notes: The degree of credit crunch is calculated as the differences between supply and demand shifts (demand shift－supply shift) and take average 
over all prefectures. As for the definition of the supply and demand shift, see Figure3.  42














































































large firms  medium-sized firms small firms
 
Notes: Data are of all enterprises, all industries, and evaluation of current situation...The data source is the Tankan (Short-term Economic Survey in 
Japan), the Bank of Japan. The diffusion index is defined as the ratio of the firms considering that lending attitude becomes severer – the ratio of the 
firms considering that lending attitude becomes laxer. The sample period is from fourth quarter in 1990 to second quarter in 2002. 
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actual shift shift due to supply side shift due to demand side
 
Notes: The actual shift of the prefecture for year y is the difference between the rate of change of outstanding loans of the prefecture in year y and 
that in year y-1. The shift due to supply and demand side of the prefecture for year y is calculated as follows: first, we substitute each explanatory 
variable of the prefecture in year y-1 and calculate the fitted value of supply of and demand for loans in year y. Then, substituting the loan interest 
rate of the prefecture in year y-1 and the other variables of the prefecture in year y, we calculate the fitted value in year y. The rate of change between 
the fitted values (in percent) is the shifts of the prefecture from year y-1 to y. The sample period is from 1991 to 1996. 
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actual shift shift due to supply side shift due to demand side
 
Notes: The definitions of the actual shift, shift due to supply side, and shift due to demand side are the same as those of Figure6.  The sample period 
is from 1996 to 2000.  45







































































































































































































































































































































DIFF91:the degree of credit crunch (1991-1996) DIFF00: the degree of credit crunch (1996-2000)
 
Notes: The degree of credit crunch of the prefecture is calculated as the differences between supply and demand shifts of the prefecture (demand 
shift－supply shift). As for the definitions of the supply and demand shift of the prefecture, see Figure6. The sample periods are from 1991 to 1996, 
and from 1996 to 2000. 